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This article argues that international development assistance projects are
an ideal way for governments to communicate social values to interna-
tional audiences and also to consolidate support or seek legitimacy from
its domestic public. The case study for this article is the Taiwan Interna-
tional Cooperation and Development Fund. The text argues that this or-
ganization should sit at the forefront of the Taiwan government’s
communications strategy because of recent trends in political communica-
tions and also circumstances specific to Taiwan’s domestic and interna-
tional political situation. The research found that the ICDF has taken on
more political communications responsibilities in recent years as a result of
changes in Taiwan’s international political circumstances and the evolution
of a democratic society at home. KEYWORDS: political communications, de-
velopment assistance, Taiwan.
GOVERNMENTS AROUND THE WORLD WOULD HAVE THEIR AUDIENCES BELIEVE
that their commitment to international development assistance reflects their
congruence with international legislation and norms of behavior and a phil-
anthropic desire to see extreme poverty eradicated. However, international
development assistance plays a deliberate and often understated role in the
consolidation of the source government’s power and influence over its audi-
ence. This is by no means an innovative concept: Carol Lancaster’s author-
itative text on foreign aid established that governments have a variety of
reasons for offering assistance to publics in the underdeveloped world
beyond a virtuous concern for those in need. These include adherence to
internationally established development goals, national political and eco-
nomic motives, and domestic political concerns.1
Accordingly, international development assistance has the potential to
operate as an effective communications device for a contemporary govern-
ment. This is largely because we live in an era where control of the infor-
mation environment is vital to political ambitions. However, the associated
increase in communications bureaucracy can lead to greater public uncer-
tainty and mistrust of political elites. Moreover, advances in communica-
tions technology have meant that it is increasingly difficult to separate
domestic and international audiences. This has resulted in the propagation
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of more generic communications, which often try to speak to everybody,
yet nobody, simultaneously. Consequently, greater emphasis is now being
placed on deeds within political communications strategy, resulting in an
increasing focus on the communications potential of international develop-
ment assistance. 
The case study for this article is the Taiwan International Cooperation
and Development Fund (ICDF). I argue that there is considerable evidence
to suggest that this organization is a communications vanguard to the
domestic and international political priorities of the Taiwan government.
The ICDF continues to take on more political communications responsibil-
ities as a result of changes in Taiwan’s international political circumstances
and the evolution of a democratic society at home. Next, I further discuss
political communications, implicit communications, and international
development assistance. I then provide a brief contextual overview of Tai-
wan’s political communications history. Finally, I discuss the ICDF in
depth, arguing that its importance to Taiwan’s communications output
should not be underestimated.
The Political Communications of 
International Development Assistance
We might live in the age of information, but we also live in the age of polit-
ical claptrap, of empty language. Gerald Sussman provides some reasoning
for this when he argues that “the maintenance of the corporate state requires
an intensification of public persuasion through various forms of promo-
tional speech and text in order to divert citizens from the cognitive disso-
nance that follows the unwillingness of the neoliberal state to protect pub-
lic interests.”2 As such, more resources need to be spent on political
communications if the state is to convince publics of their value as citizens
rather than just consumers. Indeed, the post–Cold War neoliberal world has
witnessed a commodification of culture, the further off-loading of services
that were once the responsibility of the state to civic and corporate respon-
sibility, and a system of mass communications that tries to appeal to every-
body, yet nobody, simultaneously. Therefore, it is highly implausible that
states would undertake international development assistance based on phil-
anthropic concerns when they are barely inclined to assist their own popu-
lations. Rather, development assistance should be seen as a political tool
from the same box as other carrot-and-stick measures that international
actors use to achieve their political and economic desires.
Furthermore, governments are increasingly run like businesses. They
employ spin doctors, undertake branding initiatives, perform reputation
management, and are increasingly subservient to corporate industry rather
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than the people to which they remain accountable (at least within democ-
racies). Moreover, calls for transparency mean the publication of accounts,
much like a public limited company, and subsequent scrutiny and justifica-
tion of expenditure. Therefore, it follows that the funding of international
development assistance should be in line with the economic and political
interests of the source, if the government is to avoid accusations of finan-
cial mismanagement or haemorrhage. 
On this topic, Adam Habib argues that “ultimately, it would [be] pru-
dent for advocates of African development (from all sides) to recognise that
all countries involved in Africa are here to advance their own national inter-
ests, and any harbouring of contrary illusions can only result in future dis-
appointment.”3 Therefore, according to Habib, while outright plunder can-
not occur as it once did, the benefits that such developed world assistance
has for these publics is subordinate to their self-interests. As such, “win-
win” or “mutual benefit” are terms often heard around modern international
development assistance projects. This emphasizes the extent of the eco-
nomic accountability that governments must emphasize to its audiences in
the neoliberal age. 
Nevertheless, development assistance relies on philanthropy at least at
the grassroots level of delivery and so awareness of the organization’s
wider political tasks might sit uneasily with employees who consider
poverty alleviation to be the primary goal. The Japan International Coop-
eration Agency (JICA) is one of the largest and most famous development
assistance and foreign aid organizations in the world. It has also been a
mentor of sorts to the Taiwan ICDF. JICA provides development assistance
and foreign aid to underdeveloped countries around the world and is part of
the political communications outreach of the Japan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA). JICA performs a number of communications functions
within wider government objectives, including the repair of Japan’s inter-
national image after World War II, participation in the resolution of inter-
national crises despite military sanctions against Japan, persuasion of gov-
ernments in the underdeveloped world to back a permanent Japanese seat at
the UN Security Council, rebuilding the confidence of the Japanese people
post–World War II; and helping to secure a ready supply of finite energy
resources.4 The JICA example emphasizes the extent to which international
development assistance organizations look to appeal to a mixture of domes-
tic and international audiences beyond the immediate recipients of their
output. However, in recent years, JICA has been criticized for what Jun
Morikawa calls a “credibility gap” between its rhetoric of development
assistance and the organization’s clear political and economic intentions,
leading to heightened distrust of the organization among domestic and
international audiences.5
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Taiwan
Pal Kolsto refers to Taiwan as the “extreme success story”6 of what are
termed “quasi-states.”7 However, barring a few exceptions such as the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Taiwan cannot participate in
international organizations, its segregation being assured by the interna-
tional power and influence of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter,
China), with which it has had a dispute over sovereignty since 1949. Thus,
while Taiwan is a wealthy country by international standards, fulfills most
of the criteria of secessionism, enjoys healthy relations with several major
world powers, and has a diplomatic corps that confidently publicizes both
the former and the latter, it remains internationally isolated. Under such
constraints, the Taiwan government’s ability to communicate with the out-
side world and with the people within its own borders is crucial to the
state’s very existence. This is in contrast to most other political entities that
do not have such comprehensive diplomatic hostility to deal with and,
therefore, can work on a more elaborate level. 
Taiwan’s relations with China form much of the backdrop for Taiwan’s
forays into development assistance and foreign aid. Garth Le Pere argues
that it was the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955 between a host of
Asian and newly independent African states that instigated the initial push
by China (and shortly after, by Taiwan) toward development assistance in
the underdeveloped world. This was largely part of China’s attempt to join
the UN, but also reflected its desire to become the leader of the Non-
Aligned Group of states that developed during the Cold War.China’s
engagement consisted of 
agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries, textiles and other light industries,
energy, transportation, broadcasting and communication, water conservation,
public and civil construction, education and health. Some of the flagship
projects included the 1860km Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), the
Port of Friendship in Mauritania, the 122km Canal of Friendship in Tunisia,
the International Convention Centre in Cairo, and an 80,000 capacity stadium
in Kinshasa.8
Beyond this we also see a degree of military and education diplomacy,
financial aid, and state bribery from both Taiwan and China as they com-
peted for international allies. Thus, Taiwan’s investment in international
development assistance should be seen as part of its wider international ide-
ological competition with China, with fluctuations in its output and empha-
sis somewhat related to changes in relations between the two adversaries. 
At present, Taiwan and China are enjoying a period of amicability and
this is reflected in Taiwan’s development assistance being more concen-
trated on poverty alleviation in the underdeveloped world. However, when
relations deteriorated, for example, during the presidency of pro-Taiwan
122 Development Assistance and Communication
independence leader Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), political aspects of
development assistance became more visible. As such, analysis of develop-
ment assistance output can be a significant indicator of wider political cur-
rents involving China and Taiwan.
International development assistance is a good way for a government
to improve its international and domestic image since it is less likely to
incur the inquisition that is bestowed on much of the empty language that
so many governments disseminate with ease today. However, for marginal-
ized governments, it is more attractive given their preoccupation with inter-
national and domestic sovereign legitimacy. As such, development assis-
tance allows marginalized governments to contribute to international
projects like the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) while not
being members of the international organization under discussion. This, in
turn, provides the government with international prestige and domestic
compliance because of its consistency with the prevailing values and prac-
tices of the international system.
Apart from Taiwan, Cuba is another notable example of a marginalized
national government with extensive international development assistance and
aid projects. On Cuba’s renowned program of foreign medical aid, Michael
Bustamante and Julia Sweig assert that “Cuba . . . has long used foreign aid
to garner international support. Yet it is not aid in and of itself that acts as a
public diplomacy asset but, rather, the particular way in which it is deployed,
marketed and received as part of a greater humanitarian social project.”9
Thus, Cuba uses foreign aid, and medical assistance in particular, as
part of its political communications outreach to engage beyond those peo-
ple receiving treatment and create greater leverage with a host of domestic
and international audiences. Taiwan, like Cuba, Japan, and other countries
with prominent development assistance and foreign aid agencies, selec-
tively uses its provision as a political tool. Thus, it is possible to track this
practice against the country’s political and economic priorities.
Taiwan and China have enjoyed a period of positive relations since the
Kuomintang (KMT) national party returned to power under President Ma
Ying-jeou in 2008. This began shortly after Ma Ying-jeou’s election win in
May 2008, around which time a “diplomatic truce” was agreed between the
two sides. The diplomatic truce has prevented countries from switching their
recognition between Beijing and Taipei, and arguably has facilitated the
most meaningful dialogue between Taiwan and China since the split in 1949.
Under these conditions, the functions of the ICDF communicate the values
of Taiwan to important foreign and domestic audiences, help to counter the
political communications of China in regard to its diplomatic claim to Tai-
wan, and alleviate the pressure that the Chinese exert on Taiwan’s formal
diplomatic allies to abandon their allegiances with Taipei. Thus, while not
being under the direct control of a government communications department,
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the ICDF reinforces Taiwan’s communications priorities both domestically
and internationally, and offers a consistency in its communications output
through turnovers of political power that have the potential to drastically
alter the emphasis of other governmental departments.
The Research Framework
This article is the culmination of several years of my intermittent research
into the Taiwan ICDF and the political communications of international
development assistance and aid organizations. I conducted ten in-depth
semistructured interviews with ICDF staff between 2011 and early 2013,
and spent some time with staff observing their grassroots engagement with
local people in foreign countries. Not all of the interviews have been used
in this article. The interviewees came from across the organization, includ-
ing the secretary-general, directors, senior managers, heads of the ICDF in
different countries, engineers, and volunteer staff. This allowed for the
development of a comprehensive understanding of the structures and poli-
tics within the organization and their priorities at different levels. I am
grateful for the time provided by all of those concerned. 
The Taiwan International 
Cooperation and Development Fund
The ICDF is Taiwan’s primary international development assistance agency.
It has a permanent presence in twenty-one of Taiwan’s twenty-three formal
diplomatic allies and several other missions in other countries around the
world, including Bahrain, Ecuador, Kenya, Libya, Mongolia, Papua New
Guinea, and South Sudan.10 The ICDF projects are structured into four
groups: technical cooperation, humanitarian assistance, lending and invest-
ment, and international education and training. The ICDF is also perhaps
Taiwan’s most publicly transparent government agency and lists of its past
and present projects, budgets, and impact assessments can be viewed
online.11 Even though Taiwan is not a member of the UN, the ICDF is fully
committed to UN MDGs around capacity building in the underdeveloped
world. The ICDF was formed in 1996 as part of institutional reforms imple-
mented by the administration of President Lee Teng-hui as Taiwan moved
into its postauthoritarian era.12 The ICDF was the amalgamation of the
Committee of International Technical Cooperation (CITC) and the Interna-
tional Economic Cooperation Development Fund (IECDF), and was the
culmination of a move that sought to give the new agency greater inde-
pendence from government.13
Taiwan’s first foray into international development assistance came in
1959 when it assisted its capitalist ally South Vietnam after the outbreak of
the Vietnam War. China was allied with the North Vietnamese. Taiwan’s
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development assistance advanced in 1961 when it began projects to some
of the newly independent African states in a bid to gain diplomatic recog-
nition ahead of China.14 This was known as Operation Vanguard in refer-
ence to its anti-Communist prerogative. Taiwan was still a poor country
during the 1950s and 1960s so the money for these projects came from the
US Treasury, and was designed to spread capitalist ideology to the peas-
antry across the underdeveloped world in the hope that it would prevent
supposedly Communist insurrection.15 In line with the Taiwan govern-
ment’s own ideology, Operation Vanguard was tasked with helping the pro-
Taiwan governments of these allied countries to stay in power by teaching
their peasantry the basics of market economics. As such, the precursors to
the ICDF functioned as international political tools for the Taiwan govern-
ment, their emphases being to create or reward ideological symmetry
among the ruling elites and publics of other countries. This meant that
development assistance as a public priority was largely a facade.
In light of this, I asked ICDF’s deputy director for technical coopera-
tion, Yen Ming-hong, to explain the extent of his organization’s interna-
tional political tasks today:
CA: Do you consider the work that you do to be diplomatic?
YMH: Yes we do, the work that we do is highly related to the diplo-
matic work of Taiwan. First, the countries that we do our work are
mainly allies. They have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Second,
we cooperate a lot with the Taiwan embassies in these countries. In
fact, to be honest, we only take projects that come from the Taiwan
embassies in these countries. So we take the diplomatic relation-
ship as a serious topic. 
CA: So the role of the ICDF is to complement the diplomatic relationship?
YMH: Yes, it is.16
Thus, we see clear awareness of the ICDF’s political role, yet also an
acknowledgment that the people executing such tasks have concerns
beyond this. I also asked Yen Ming-hong to compare the contemporary
ICDF with the agencies that preceded it:
In the 1960s the reason why we were involved in international aid was totally
a diplomatic concern. As you know, we are no longer a member of the United
Nations, and during that time the Taiwan government tried to keep our allied
countries in Africa. So what they came up with was to send out a lot of tech-
nical missions to stay there and to provide agricultural assistance in the hope
that we can have their diplomatic support. In that time, we were not focused
on the results of the projects. We did not care about the results. We just
wanted the support of the local governments. But now we focus a lot more
on results, we have to make sure the projects deliver the outcome and impact
that they were designed for.17
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Therefore, as African countries experienced significant political, eco-
nomic, and social turmoil, Taiwan and China began to provide resources.
However, the motivation for such provision was more likely to help con-
solidate the status of favorable political regimes through ideologically
weighted projects, rather than humanitarian or philanthropic concern. What
is more, as the capacities of Taiwan and China developed, both began to
diversify their development assistance work in the underdeveloped world.18
Nevertheless, the emphasis remained away from increasing human capital
or capacity building, although this did happen in some measure, and any
positive public sentiment that these actions created was secondary to secur-
ing governmental relations. My discussions of the ICDF’s different audi-
ences that follow emphasize that this mind-set is by no means absent today,
although these concerns have diluted somewhat. 
The changes made to Taiwan’s development assistance outreach in
1996 encouraged the rebalance of Taiwan’s projects toward public depriva-
tion within its remaining formal diplomatic allies. The Cold War had come
to an end, China was no longer a Communist protectionist state, and Tai-
wan was becoming a competitive multiparty democracy with high living
standards. What is more, many nation-states in the underdeveloped world
were becoming competitive democracies themselves and Taiwan needed to
distance itself from the warlords and dictators that it had previously helped
keep in power. Although, also a reflection of domestic changes, the KMT’s
decision to become more democratic was largely one of calculation on the
part of the Lee Teng-hui administration based on a changing international
environment.19 With the victory of the United States and its allies in the
Cold War, democracy, human rights, and individual freedom had become
championed international causes. And given Taiwan’s international margin-
alization, the administration made the decision that the best defense for Tai-
wan, vis-à-vis an increasingly powerful China, was for the island to cham-
pion and participate where possible in the prevailing international political
morality. Thus, in its reforms, the Taiwan government’s primary develop-
ment assistance agency became more focused on so-called capacity build-
ing, and later on the MDGs as part of an attempt to increase the domestic
and international legitimacy of the regime.
The ICDF’s Audiences
Although they are by no means mutually exclusive, the ICDF’s audiences
can be split into four groups, each with their own motivation for being tar-
geted: publics of countries with ICDF missions, elites of formal diplomatic
allies, wider international audiences, and Taiwan’s domestic audience.
Table 1 provides clarity on these audience groups and their reasons for
being of interest to Taiwan.
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Creating positive sentiment for Taiwan among foreign and domestic
publics and elites is therefore one of the ICDF’s main prerogatives. That
said, the manufacture of image is an important part of many development
assistance organizations. However, what separates these agencies in mar-
ginalized nation-states from those in less marginalized countries is their
admission to focusing less on the direct recipients of their activities
(although the extent to which this is actually correct remains in doubt).
Thus, while the likes of JICA are tools of statecraft with mandates beyond
development assistance goals, the ICDF’s open acknowledgment of this
demonstrates a governmental approach that is more related to a marginal-
ized administration.20
The Publics of Countries with ICDF Missions
The history of Taiwan’s international development assistance leaves little
doubt as to the political and ideological motivations of its output. However,
recent evidence suggests a degree of movement away from such emphasis,
with impetus toward those actually in need of assistance. This is apparent
through the ICDF’s commitment to the MDGs and so-called capacity build-
ing rather than its pursuit of a more singular agenda. One of the best recent
examples of the ICDF becoming more mainstream is its recent partnering
with the US charity Food for the Poor in its relief efforts in Haiti. Accord-
ing to ICDF personnel in the country, the partnership allowed the two
organizations to complement each other’s proficiencies and resources and
provide a more effective relief operation.21 Thus, it was a clear example of
human need overtaking concern for political impact. However, this situa-
tion was more likely a consequence of the chaotic political situation in
postearthquake Haiti that had suspended much of Taiwan’s prioritization of
political relations. 
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Table 1   Taiwan’s Audiences for Development Assistance
Audience Motivation for Engagement
Publics of countries • Genuine need for assistance
with ICDF missions • Recognition of their democratic political power
Elites of formal diplomatic allies • Continued formal diplomatic recognition
• Ideological patronage
Wider international audiences • Create space for positive international discussion of Taiwan
• Demonstrates congruence with international projects and norms
Taiwan’s domestic audience • Provide an international outlet for a highly skilled population
• Consolidates domestic sovereignty
Note: ICDF, Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund.
Nevertheless, the ICDF’s movement toward the people of the countries
with ICDF missions is also exemplified in the organization’s creation of
Mobile Medical Missions (MMMs) in 2006. These small land-based med-
ical clinics travel to Taiwan’s diplomatic allies offering free medical care,
normally for about two weeks at a time, before moving to another country
or region. The roving clinics give Taiwan a more regular medical presence
than before and demonstrate an adjustment toward the direct needs of the
rural poor in these countries. The MMM focus tends to be on rural villages
and, given the awkward terrain in which they tend to travel, MMMs num-
ber around thirty personnel and carry only equipment and supplies that are
easily transportable. In El Salvador, for example, MMMs have focused on
treating simple ailments and conducting simple procedures, including pro-
viding antibiotics to treat Chagas disease, conducting pregnancy screenings,
issuing educational leaflets and advice, and extracting decayed teeth and
providing other dental care.
Before 2006 the ICDF partnered with Taiwanese international charities
and private nonprofit organizations such as the Tzu Chi Foundation and the
Taiwan Root Medical Peace Corps (TRMPC) to provide medical assistance.
However, much of this work was focused in cities and involved medical
training partnerships, or was in response to natural disasters rather than
issues of regular access to health care. In an example of the former, twenty
doctors from Chang Gung Hospital in Kaoshiung visited Guatemala from
11 to 24 September 2010 to perform operations and, in the process, train
Guatemalan medics in the treatment of cleft pallet, liver disease, and liver
transplant.22 Examples of the latter include the arrival of the TRMPC with
a twenty-three-person team to treat some of those affected by extensive
flooding in El Salvador in November 2011 and the Tzu Chi Foundation’s
assistance in November 2009 to some of those affected by Hurricane Ida
across Central America.23
As such, there is evidence to suggest that the ICDF is becoming more
engaged with the publics of the countries where it works. Lin Kuo-chung
from the Taipei Representative Office in London puts this down to the
democratization of many of Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies: “[Engaging
with the public] is more important in a democracy as the government is
elected by the people and their views are therefore represented. In a non-
democracy [it] is less important.”24 However, his statement indicates that
it is not the foreign public per se that Taiwan values, but rather its ability to
influence those in power. His statement therefore also allows my research
to position this audience below that of the other audiences being discussed. 
Moreover, while there is little doubt that democratization is a factor in
the changes made by the ICDF, the organization’s resistance to such change
should also be considered since there are examples of the continuing prior-
itization of political ambitions over public needs in much of the ICDF’s
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work. On the island state of Saint Lucia, I asked one of the ICDF’s health
educators about the direction that she had been given by either the ICDF or
the Taiwan embassy in Castries regarding her role and objectives. Her
answer demonstrates the degree of interest that Taiwan has in the people of
Saint Lucia. 
CA: How was your teaching structured, were you set targets, were you
provided with the necessary equipment to do your job?
ICDF: Actually there was no equipment.
CA: Do you need equipment?
ICDF: Yes, I really need a printer because I need to print out informa-
tion for the patients. I can show them on my laptop but it is not
always safe to go walking around with a laptop. Also they can take
the information home with them. There is a Taiwan mission in St.
Lucia. The head of the mission was my boss in St. Lucia. How-
ever, he said that he is not responsible for us and that we cannot
use any equipment in the mission office, including the printer, only
in some emergency cases. Also, they don’t have printers in the
health centres, only one in the local supervisor’s office. But it’s
black and white and it seems to always have problems.
CA: Have you asked for a printer from the ICDF?
ICDF: They say it is not available to me. Also, if I give a talk about
obesity I might want to print some pictures or diagrams, but I can-
not do this. Also, if I do an exercise activity I might want to print
some fliers or some posters. Sometimes it is really hard to work. 
CA: When you arrived were you given any targets, and do you work
from a set programme that is consistent across the ICDF?
ICDF: No, all by myself, no programme.25
This minimalist approach to the volunteer program, manifest in the
lack of resources and direction to those working at the grassroots level was
also evident in other countries and other areas of the ICDF’s provision. In
El Salvador, I interviewed several volunteer ICDF Mandarin teachers in
order to discover the extent of the ICDF’s investment in the education of
those who enrolled in language classes. The following extract is from an
interview that I conducted there in 2011. 
CA: Have you been set performance targets regarding the uptake of
Mandarin courses? If so, what are they?
WYF: No there haven’t been any targets. When I arrived there was no
textbook on teaching Mandarin to Spanish speakers so I had to ask
the embassy for money to buy them. I think that the Taiwan gov-
ernment uses us as a diplomacy tool; they aren’t really interested
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in the results, just in their relationship with the local government
here in El Salvador. They are not really focused on the teaching
itself. 
CA: So you believe your government’s focus on this is part of a show,
so they can go to the El Salvador government and say, “look, we
are teaching people Mandarin?”
WYF: Yes, exactly. The teaching is not taken too seriously.26
The ICDF discontinued all Mandarin teaching to foreign publics in
2013. The ICDF’s decision to do this underlines the extent to which Taiwan
prioritizes other audiences ahead of the foreign publics it engages with,
with the experiences of volunteer Mandarin teachers overseas demonstrat-
ing that the ICDF had little interest in seriously progressing the language
skills of those enrolled. As such, while some reforms have been made
within the ICDF and there has been recognition of the democratization
process within many of Taiwan’s formal allies, the ICDF continues to
engage with foreign publics largely to the point that they are perceived as
useful in meeting greater political ends.
Elites of Formal Diplomatic Allies
Despite the agreement of the diplomatic truce with the mainland in 2008,
keeping strong political relations with formal diplomatic governments
remains a priority for Taiwan. This is the case for a number of reasons.
First, there is recognition on both sides that the truce is largely an informal
agreement, respected while it is in the interest of both parties to comply.
Second, while diplomatic transfer might not be possible, this does not, and
has not, stopped both sides from building economic, social, and cultural
relations with the others’ allies as well as lobbying parliaments and build-
ing patronage between politicians and political parties. And finally, the
truce does not prevent proactivity toward China on the part of formal allies
themselves. This final point has been evident in Taiwan’s recent relation-
ship with Honduras, which has made some not unobvious political maneu-
vers to distance itself from Taipei during 2013 despite retaining formal ties
and which has declared itself open to relations with Beijing. 
Influencing the elites of their diplomatic allies in a positive way is the
most pressing concern of Taiwan’s formal diplomatic output. More specifi-
cally, the activities of the ICDF offer Taiwan a chance to assist various for-
eign government ministries where they cannot, or will not, make domestic
social provisions, in the hope that it will improve public opinion toward the
incumbent regime in the process. That said, it is not unknown for foreign
political elites to direct international development assistance to the public
on a political rather than penury basis. However, this is a conflict that fre-
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quently exists for all international development assistance and aid agencies
in the underdeveloped world and so is by no means unique to Taiwan’s
predicament. 
I asked Yen Ming-hong about Taiwan’s conduct in the young democ-
racies that it holds formal relations with:
YMH: What the governments of our allied countries ask of the Taiwan
ICDF is really in the interests of the people, but it could be only
representing a small group of the people. 
CA: OK, here’s a hypothetical situation for you. The government of
one of your allies asks the ICDF to undertake some projects, but
the selectivity of the projects is only to areas that are political
strongholds of the government. 
YMH: That can be the case. That’s true.27
A recent extreme example of such a practice comes from Saint Lucia.
After Taiwan’s rerecognition by Castries in 2007, the ICDF ran a series of
MMM clinics in the constituencies that had United Workers Party (UWP)
incumbency (confirmed by an unnamed source). Furthermore, in 2008 Tai-
wan opened an educational center in the personal office of National Secu-
rity Minister Guy Mayers (UWP–Castries East). Both incidents demon-
strated Taiwan’s favoring of the right-wing UWP party and the use of the
ICDF as a political tool to influence incumbent political elites. 
This practice is not isolated to Saint Lucia. About Taiwan’s medical
assistance in Guatemala, Third Secretary Daniel Chen said: “We fully coop-
erate with the Ministry of Health and the First Lady’s Office on these proj-
ects. We go on their advice and directions as to where to go, even which
towns and villages etc. We provide all the equipment and they provide
security and part of the transport.”28
This quotation emphasizes the extent to which relations with the elites
are prioritized above those with the public, the local result being that, by
following the recommendations of the Guatemalan government, Taiwan
(and the ICDF) do not necessarily assist those most in need but rather those
strategically placed around policy objectives. This can be demonstrated in
Guatemala through analysis of the locations where the ICDF has carried out
medical clinics in recent years. Most apparent is the lack of presence in the
poorest regions of the country. Indeed, the ICDF’s health care work is
almost entirely in majority Spanish-speaking departments—for example,
Zacapa, Escuintla, and Jalapa—which have little in the way of indigenous
ethnicities and are statistically some of the wealthiest areas of the country.
The sizable non-Spanish speaking Guatemalan population, which suffers
from some of the most serious poverty levels in the world and is vastly
underrepresented in Guatemalan politics, is therefore largely ignored by
Colin Alexander 131
Taiwan’s development assistance since it prioritizes elite relationships over
human need.29
There is, however, some evidence that Taiwan’s use of the ICDF for
political purposes is waning. Tao Wen-lung, secretary-general of the ICDF,
provides some context: “[Previously] in the Solomon Islands [the ICDF
have been] asked to go to a constituency and it turn[ed] out that it was the
ambassador to Taiwan’s hometown. In 2011, 6 months before the [St.
Lucia] election, I sent an instruction to every member of the ICDF team
saying ‘No member of the mission should do anything other than follow the
book,’” the protocol. No extra activities. Do not accept any instruction from
our embassy to do anything that is not in the agreed framework. I cc’d
MOFA on too.”30
As such, at the 2011 general election in Saint Lucia, there were no
known ICDF extra activities such as those discussed previously. However,
the decline of the ICDF as a political tool does not negate to a decline in
Taiwan’s interest in the elites of these countries. Thus, while there is a sug-
gestion that the ICDF is now less compliant with some of the more
unorthodox MOFA demands, there is other evidence to suggest that Taiwan
embassies have continued in their attempts to influence elites by their pro-
vision of assistance to favorable administrations. 
Wider International Audiences
The partial attempt by the ICDF to distance itself from Taiwan’s diplomatic
culture of influencing the policy of foreign governments, however, by no
means implies that the ICDF no longer seeks to communicate with foreign
audiences regarding Taiwan. Indeed, Taiwan, like many other countries
around the world, has spent increasingly more time considering Joseph
Nye’s concept of “soft power” and focusing on how to improve its ability to
“persuade” rather than “coerce” in the international arena.31 Thus, part of
Taiwan’s soft power strategy has been the utilization of the ICDF with
wider international audiences. The announcement of a diplomatic truce in
2008 was the catalyst to the ICDF’s efforts to represent Taiwan within the
international arena. Prior to the diplomatic truce, Taiwan had asked its for-
mal diplomatic allies to raise the issue of Taiwan rejoining the UN on a
near-yearly basis. However, this stopped after 2008. Part of the job of the
ICDF therefore has been to create international space for Taiwan by formu-
lating positive discussion about the country’s impact in the world. I asked
Secretary-General Tao Wen-lung to explain more about this role:
CA: What the ICDF does therefore is about Taiwan’s image around the
world and also to the people of Taiwan?
TWL: Yes. In the last few years I have done a lot of research into this
and I think that we are getting results. For example, I had a call
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from an NGO [nongovernmental organization] chief in this coun-
try, a medical doctor, saying that our image has widely improved.
Now everyone is talking about the ICDF.
CA: So Taiwan is not a member of the UN and many other interna-
tional organisations, but the work of the ICDF creates international
space for Taiwan?
TWL: Yes, especially because we are so constrained diplomatically. We
need to utilise options like this more than other countries. To do
more of this than the likes of JICA need to do. Taiwan must utilise
organisations like the ICDF for this purpose. For example, I just
returned from the EDR (Economic Development Research) meet-
ing and they said that the ICDF is a good example of the work that
they want to do and I was warmly greeted by a lot of people. A
number of East European and Central Asian countries wanted to
meet with me.32
Thus, the ICDF now performs a surrogate role within international fora
that attempts to keep the topic of conversation positively about Taiwan.
Additionally, the ICDF has been increasingly interested in partnering with
other international NGOs and government organizations, also in a bid to
increase Taiwan’s international space. In El Salvador, for example, the
ICDF has partnered with the Catholic Relief Services, an international
NGO that undertakes development projects in some of the world’s poorest
communities, working with local partners in the areas of health, food secu-
rity, and employment.33 Whereas in postearthquake Haiti, the ICDF has
started a significant ongoing relationship with the US charity Food for the
Poor. Regine Liu, humanitarian assistance project manager with the ICDF,
explains a little more about the political motivation of this new relationship:
CA: In Haiti and in other countries you are working with NGOs, Food
for the Poor for example, why do you do this?
RL: Well each case is different. Food for the Poor is one of the most
famous NGOs in the US, they are renowned for their fundraising
ability and they have very good relations with politicians. They
work closely and have a very good relationship with our represen-
tative office in the United States. That’s one reason. The second is
that our objectives are similar, they want to feed the poor and they
work in agricultural projects which produce food.34
As such, working with Food for the Poor partly allows the ICDF and
Taiwan further engagement with the political elite of the United States—
their stated priority international audience according to Peter Huang, direc-
tor general of department of policy planning, Taiwan MOFA—while also
increasing the possibility of improved public opinion with US audiences.35
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The ICDF is therefore a significant part of Taiwan’s attempt to influence its
soft power among strategically targeted international audiences. 
Taiwan’s Domestic Audience
Finally, there must be consideration of the domestic audience in Taiwan.
The provision of international development assistance and foreign aid can
improve the image of the government in the eyes of its own people as being
a responsible and compassioned international actor. This is especially the
case when the government has challenges to its sovereignty from domestic
and international sources such as the situation in Taiwan vis-à-vis China.
Thus, how the Taiwanese government asserts Taiwan’s image internation-
ally has considerable ramifications for its popularity at home. This is espe-
cially so now that Taiwan has entered a postauthoritarian era with genuine
rivalry existing in its domestic politics. I asked Secretary-General Tao Wen-
lung about the ICDF’s domestic tasks: 
CA: Is the [ICDF’s] task also about the Taiwan government’s relation-
ship with its own people, about creating political legitimacy?
TWL: That is also important. . . . When I arrived in this post: “we need
to be transparent and we need to be well-prepared because if we
are not then the President, the people, they will not have confi-
dence in us.” We do so many joint ventures now and civil society’s
understanding is so important. 
CA: Is this also about Taiwan moving from dictatorship to democracy?
TWL: It is part of it. We have an obligation in this transition period. You
must provide information so that people can make their decisions.
But a lot of civil servants are still hesitant about this. They have
such bad habits of not providing information. Civil society becomes
suspicious and thinks that the government is still doing something
that they do not like. So I spend a lot of time out of the office. If I
am invited to speak in front of students, NGOs, I will go, because
we must seize this opportunity. It is part of democratisation.36
The secretary-general well understood the domestic purpose of the ICDF.
Thus, in its communications role, the ICDF works with domestic audiences
to improve the stature of Taiwan’s government and its international output. 
Emphasizing the ICDF’s work abroad to domestic audiences began in
2000 after Chen Shui-bian was elected as Taiwan’s president. I asked a Dem-
ocratic Progressive Party (DPP) official to explain why they had decided to
emphasize the ICDF:
At that time we started thinking more about the concept of public diplomacy,
in terms of getting Taiwanese people to think more about how Taiwan’s gov-
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ernment has been helping these countries over the previous years through
agricultural assistance, medical assistance, other assistance and volunteer
work. Because before 2000, few Taiwanese people understood much about
Taiwan’s allies in Africa, the South Pacific etc. So when Chen made his first
overseas trips to Taiwan’s allies in Central and South America and Africa—I
recall he visited 6 or 7 countries in two weeks—we brought Taiwan media
with us and they reported on the extent of the ICDF’s work. The Taiwanese
people got to know more about Taiwan’s work in its allies, and this was the
beginning of our attempts to introduce the concept of public diplomacy at
home. We believe that foreign policy is an extension of domestic support. We
need to let the domestic audience know what Taiwan and the Taiwan govern-
ment’s contribution is to the international system and its international allies.37
Therefore, as Taiwan consolidated its democracy through a peaceful
turnover of elected power, the new regime sought to consolidate the demo-
cratic process by bringing greater transparency to Taiwan’s foreign activi-
ties. At the same time, this was an attempt by the government to acquire
greater sovereign legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 
In addition, the ICDF has tried to encourage the participation of volun-
teers from all areas of society to engage with their programs. This is about
getting more people involved with the ICDF, but also a recognition that Tai-
wan has developed a highly skilled labor force whose expertise could be
diplomatically useful. I asked all of the interviewees from the ICDF a ques-
tion about why it was important for Taiwan to engage in international
development assistance, and all provided the same answer: that Taiwan had
a moral obligation to help other countries because it had been very poor in
its recent history and had received international assistance. The uniformity
of the answer provided is a consequence of the training program provided
to new employees and volunteers. Wang Yi-fei, who first volunteered in El
Salvador in 2008, describes the training program:
Before I left for El Salvador I had 6 weeks of training by the ICDF. This con-
sisted of 3 hours in the morning of Spanish tuition, and then we had Mandarin
teacher training in the afternoon for 2 or 3 weeks. We also received lectures
on why volunteering for projects such as this is important. The ICDF used the
US Peace Corps and JICA from Japan as examples of good practice. They also
brought in people who had volunteered before to share their experiences. This
helped to give us some teaching ideas and gave us an inclination as to what
was going on in these countries. . . . They said that Taiwan at one point re-
ceived a lot of international assistance and that this helped us become the suc-
cessful country that we are now. It is therefore our duty to do the same for
other countries, now that we are in a strong position to do so.38
Other interviewees provided variations of the same core statement. Fur-
thermore, this statement emphasizes the extent to which the ICDF has been
used to implicitly unify what is otherwise a country struggling with a con-
tested identity, as people from across political and spiritual divides can
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relate to these values. Interestingly, the statement is also based on one of
the key philosophies of Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China,
who said that “only if we rescue the weak and lift up the fallen will we be
carrying out the divine obligation of our nation.”39 Therefore, now that Tai-
wan has reached a strong standard of domestic living, both the KMT and
the DPP have emphasized Taiwan’s moral obligation to assist the needy
abroad, and organizations like the ICDF play a key role in implementing
this policy through building ties with the domestic audience.40
Conclusion
Using the specifics of the Taiwan ICDF as a case study, I have sought to
clarify and expand the reasons why governments engage in international
development assistance. This article has two central arguments. First, we
live in an era of empty language or claptrap, where politicians and civil ser-
vants exist behind layers of communications bureaucracy, and this is leading
to severe public distrust of political rhetoric. Under such conditions, gov-
ernments are well advised to use deeds rather than words if they are to fur-
ther their levels of approval. International development assistance is there-
fore one way that this can be achieved. Second, the employment of a
political communications framework to the analysis of development assis-
tance can help to advance the debate on its international effectiveness
beyond the predominant context of political economy. Thus, the political
communications approach can help to identify potential audiences beyond
those immediately impacted and shed further light on the purpose of the
activities. Consequently, it would be prudent for all analysts to recognize
that no state undertakes international development assistance on purely phil-
anthropic grounds; if they did, the disparity between the rich and poor would
stop rising at the rates that it does. Moreover, it is illogical for the neoliberal
state to do this as it would involve the relinquishment of economic power to
potential competitors. Instead, development assistance should be seen as part
of a state’s attempt to consolidate its political, economic, and social capital. 
The Taiwan ICDF has made significant changes to its international
conduct in recent years. These have been in line with political movements
in Taiwan that have sought to democratize and mainstream Taiwan under
international consensus regarding universal values and engagement with the
underdeveloped world. Nevertheless, the ICDF’s political function remains
a high priority. Alongside its contemporary emphasis on capacity building
among the world’s poor, the organization remains dedicated to communi-
cating with foreign elites who look favorably on Taipei and, in recent years,
it has expanded its communications operations to engage with international
fora as de facto representatives of the Taiwan government. This was the
result of international restrictions agreed to by Taiwan in the wake of a
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diplomatic truce between the island and the Chinese mainland in 2008.
Finally, the ICDF engages with Taiwan’s domestic audience as a method of
uniting a still somewhat polarized political entity. Organizations like the
ICDF therefore have grown in political stature in recent years as direct trust
in politicians has waned at home and around the world. However, develop-
ment assistance organizations must ensure that they keep checks on the bal-
ance between their wider political activities and the direct impact of the
work that they do at grassroots level; a loss of public confidence in the lat-
ter would lead to crises in their political integrity as well.  
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